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Regulatory Cooperation and the 
Trump Administration 
David Zaring* 
Regulatory harmonization has allowed financial institutions 
to conform to similar standards—absent international or 
administrative law—for the past forty years. In light of the 
Trump administration’s economic and international approaches 
to foreign countries, one might expect regulatory harmonization 
to be threatened. This article suggests that regulatory 
cooperation has proven to be resilient to administrative change, 
and “sticky” in that it makes exiting cooperative regulation 
difficult. While the Trump administration’s policies have 
affected regulatory harmonization, several factors indicate that 
American financial regulators remain committed to the process.  
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Introduction 
One of the great achievements of international relations in the 
past forty years has been the transformation of the regulation of 
financial institutions. It is a story that brought us from a world in 
which there was no good way for regulators – or investors, for that 
matter – to know what financial institutions were doing abroad, to 
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one in which an international process governs the most important 
rules under which any financial institution of any size operates. It is a 
story about a new form of global governance—the regulatory 
network—that has provided detailed, organized, and binding 
governance without adhering to the traditional mechanisms of 
international or administrative law. This process of “regulatory 
harmonization,” requires domestic regulators to get together with 
their foreign counterparts in an effort to conform their requirements 
to one another – to agree to do things the same way. 
One might think that this story of progress would be threatened 
by the new economic and international policies of the Trump 
administration. One of the clearest departures from the political 
orthodoxy of either party by this administration has been a change in 
how it wants the United States to handle its economic relationships 
with foreign countries. If the establishment consensus was broadly in 
favor of free trade, executed through agreements with foreign 
governments, the Trump administration shows real skepticism about 
the benefits those deals have brought to American workers, and has 
accordingly sought to renegotiate or even exit from them.1 
But the Trump administration has not ended the regulatory 
harmonization practices   that   have   so   transformed   financial   
regulation, or regulatory harmonization more generally.2 Instead, 
President Trump’s regulators have continued to embrace international 
coordination.3 The evidence suggests that the enduring appeal of 
regulatory harmonization to American policymakers could stabilize 
foreign policy between the Trump administration and the 
administrations that came before it.4 
This is not to say that regulatory harmonization has been 
unaffected by the Trump administration’s economic policies. Many of 
the actions in regulatory harmonization during the last two decades 
have involved an effort to include it as a mandate in new trade deals.5 
As some of those proposed deals were abandoned and others 
 
1. Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade Approach Diverges Sharply from Free Trade 
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/11/15/business/trump-free-trade-republicans.html 
[https://perma.cc/D2GW-XMRK]. 
2. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Trump’s New 2018 Deregulatory Agenda, FORBES 
(Dec. 18, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/waynecrews/2017/12/18/trumps-new-deregulatory-agenda/#3287378f2f60 
[https://perma.cc/456V-YMA2]. 
3. Gabriel T. Rubin, Trump Team Keeps Approach to Global Financial Rules, 
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renegotiated, it does appear that this effort to promote uniform 
standards through the trade treaty channel has been checked.  
Moreover, these regulatory coherence chapters of multilateral trade 
deals would not have only affected financial regulatory harmonization. 
They would broadly apply to all aspects of the trading relationship.  
In this article, I review the enduring commitment of American 
financial regulators to international regulatory harmonization. I show 
how regulatory cooperation in insurance regulation has checked an 
effort by the Trump administration to reduce federal involvement in 
insurance oversight. Lastly, I review the emerging efforts to include 
regulatory harmonization chapters in trade deals that the Trump 
administration has decided to eschew. 
I draw two conclusions from this practice so far. First, it suggests 
that regulatory cooperation is “sticky,” and not necessarily only to 
the taste of internationalists. Perhaps because of path dependence, 
perhaps because it works, and perhaps because of a degree of 
socialization afforded by four decades of active regulatory cooperation, 
the development of common standards for the financial markets has 
proven to be a hard habit to break. Moreover, the regular 
consultation and promulgation of rules in consultation with foreign 
regulators has proven to be a stabilizer of policy across 
administrations. 
I.  The Trump Administration’s Sustained Commitment 
to Financial Regulatory Cooperation 
Much of what has happened in international financial regulation 
began as an effort to solve coordination problems that appeared to be 
intractable under international law.  After World War II, twenty 
three largely western countries6 entered into the first multilateral 
trade deal, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and created the first two global international financial institutions, 
the World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund.7  But  
they  found  it impossible  to  make  progress  on  the  creation  of  
an  International  Financial Organization and abandoned the work 
after a modest effort.8 
There  is  still  no  international  financial  organization  or  
global  treaty outlining how financial firms should be treated when 
 
6. See Press Brief, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System, 
World Trade Org., available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).  
7. BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, What are the Bretton Woods Institutions? 
(Aug. 23, 2005), https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-
320747/. 
8. See id. (stating that only the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund were created at this conference). 
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they do business abroad.9 There is, however, a great deal of 
international financial regulation.10  Today,  the networked   domestic   
regulators—the   Basel   Committee   on   Banking Supervision,  the  
Committee  on  Payments  and  Market  Infrastructures,  the 
Financial  Action  Task  Force,  and  many more—continue  to  
promulgate  a dizzying array of standards, agreements, best practices, 
principles, and rules.11 Intertwined with these substantive efforts to 
coordinate the global regulation of  finance  has  been  an  effort  to  
improve  the  procedures  followed  by  the coordinators.12 
This evolution, both procedural and substantive, makes for a 
compelling story about a global regulatory enterprise with few peers 
not only interesting for the substance, or the process, but also for the 
institutions that have been created to manage and develop a global 
regime.  These institutions declaim legal authority and are comprised 
of regulators from  the  most important  financial  markets  coming  
together  and  agreeing  on  common approaches to supervising those 
markets.13   There is no treaty, nor are there tribunals;14 there are 
only handshake agreements (backed up by peer review, to be sure) to 
handle similar problems universally.15 
Moreover, regulators have expanded the scope of regulatory 
targets and the complexity of these institutions has evolved, 
particularly since the financial crisis.16   The old efforts to deal with 
the cross-border externalities of finance, which were limited in their 
ambitions and range17, have been cast aside. In their place, a new 
 
9. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Global Finance Regime (Jan. 23, 
2012), https://www.cfr.org/report/global-finance-regime [https://perma 
.cc/F69F-828H]. 
10. Id. 
11. Alexander Reisenbichler, The Domestic Sources and Power Dynamics of 
Regulatory Networks: Evidence from the Financial Stability Forum, 22 REV. 
OF INT’L POL. ECON. 996, 997, n. 2, 1017 (2015). 
12. Id. at 997-8; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International 
Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 133 
(2003) (analogizing these regulatory schemes to instances within domestic 
contract law where parties may decide if the agreement is legally binding or 
not). 
13. Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global 
Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 515 (2012). 
14. Id. at 498-9; David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial 
Regulations, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685, 691 (2012). 
15. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 132. 
16. See generally Cho, supra note 13 (discussing the rise and expansion of 
regulatory bodies since the 2008 financial crisis). 
17. Daniel Hemel, Regulatory and Cross Border Coordination: Challenging the 
Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 222 (2011). 
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order has emerged.  That order is hierarchical, procedurally regular, 
and politically supervised.18 
At the center of the new status quo, at least since the last 
financial crisis, is the Financial Stability Board (FSB).19 The Board is 
the middle manager of international financial regulation. It 
coordinates the efforts of regulatory networks to establish common 
standards for the oversight of financial firms, does some of that work 
in its own right, and reports to the political leadership provided by 
the Group of Twenty (G20) on the progress of harmonization 
initiatives.20 
As Randal Quarles, the Federal Reserve Board’s vice chairman for 
financial supervision, has observed, “About one of the important 
international bodies created since the crisis to promote global 
financial stability [is] the Financial Stability Board.”21 
One   might   expect   an administration   unconvinced   by   
international agreements to be skeptical of the value of the FSB.  But 
as Quarles, a Trump appointee, has explained, “America’s active 
participation in the FSB is important to our nation.”22   In his view, 
and I think it is fair to say that this is the view of most American 
financial regulators:  
[t]he FSB does not impose obligations, it addresses problems-
problems that are of great importance to the United States and 
which, because of the global nature of the financial system, we 
cannot address alone. The United States and other governments 
created the FSB and participate in it because it is in our 
national interests to do so, and that is really the basis of its 
effectiveness. The United States is not weaker or less 
independent by participating in the FSB or other standard-
setting bodies.  On the contrary, when rightly structured our 
participation in these groups makes our financial system 
significantly stronger by ensuring that the U.S. perspective is 
part of the discussions and reflected in standards agreed to. 23 
 
18. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2002). 
19. Zaring, supra note 14, at 700; Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for 
Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
America’s Vital Interest in Global Efforts to Promote Financial Stability 
(June 27, 2018), available at https://www.bis.org/review/r180716d.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GKT5-MQRM]. 
20. For an analysis, see Zaring, supra note 14, at 700-01. 
21. Quarles, supra note 19. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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In   fact,   Quarles   has   emerged   as   a   leading   candidate   
to   assume   the chairmanship  of  the  board,  a  role  that  reflects  
the  American  interest  in preserving international regulatory 
harmonization even in an era of reduced international cooperation on 
other economic matters.24   But their commitment to   the   pre-
Trump   regime   of   international   policymaking   over   banking 
regulation  indicates  one  way  in  which  the  ties  between  
regulators  from different  countries  can  stabilize  policymaking  
between  one  administration and the next. 
Other banking regulators have described the work of international 
financial regulation in similar terms.25 Trump’s choice for the 
chairmanship of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  Jerome  Powell,  has  
described  international regulatory  cooperation  as  “essential,”  and  
has,  if  anything,  suggested  that American capital rules should be 
more consistent with the global regime set forth in the third iteration 
of the  Basel Capital  Accord.26 Admittedly, this would  constitute  a  
form  of  modest  deregulation, for American  capital  rules currently   
exceed Basel’s minimum requirements, but it is worth emphasizing  
that  the  deregulation  would  only  go  so  far  as  international 
commitments permit.27 
The pattern is repeated among other American financial 
regulators. The Treasury Department has sought more transparency 
from international financial regulatory process,but has stated that it 
“generally supports efforts to finalize remaining elements of the 
international reforms at the Basel Committee.”28   Treasury Secretary 
Steven Mnuchin in 2017 issued a statement of support for the Basel 
process.29 
 
24. Nick Timiraos, Trump’s Stances Weaken Support for U.S. Official to Lead 





26. Michelle Price & Pete Schroeder, Top U.S. Regulators Confident Watchdogs 




27. David Dayen, Trump’s Regulators Want to Kill a Key Financial Rule That 
Even Republicans Support, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/146708/trumps-regulators-want-kill-key-
financial-rule-even-republicans-support [https://perma.cc/9PB8-8NJA]. 
28. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS, 16 (2017). 
29. Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s 
Statement on Basel III (Dec. 7, 2017), available at 
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This general support for international financial regulation may 
suggest   that   the   process   has   managed   to   convince   even   
financial supervisors inclined to deregulate of its value, or that these 
regulators recognize that the globalization of finance has left them 
with no choice but to participate in a global effort to oversee it.   At 
a minimum, it appears that regulators have developed a taste for 
international financial regulation that is relatively stable across 
administrations. 
II. Regulatory Harmonization as an Antidote to 
Deregulation: The Covered Agreement and Insurance 
A second example of this resilience of regulatory cooperation, at 
least in matters financial, concerns the decision by the Trump 
administration to sign a so-called covered agreement with the 
European Union on insurance supervision finalized during the last 
week of the Obama administration.30 The Trump administration has 
otherwise retreated from an emerging federal role in  insurance  
supervision,  most  notably  by  getting  out  of  the  business  of 
supervising the largest insurance companies at the federal level.31 
A.  Overview 
While the government is getting out of the business of the direct 
regulation of large insurers, a role traditionally left to the states,32 
regulatory cooperation has kept it in the business of insurance 
regulation.33 
The so-called covered agreement with the European Union 
illustrates how the growing internationalization of insurance (or 
almost anything, really) can impel American regulators, even those of 
a deregulatory bent, to engage with their foreign counterparts.  The 




30. Andrew G. Simpson, Trump Administration to Sign Insurance Regulation 
Pact with European Union, INSURANCE JOURNAL (July 17, 2017), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/07/17/ 457712 
.htm [https://perma.cc/NCS9-9MZ9]. 
31. For an analysis, see David Zaring, The Federal Deregulation of Insurance, 
97 TEXAS L. REV. J. (forthcoming 2018). 
32. Simpson, supra note 30. 
33. U.S. and EU Covered Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Pages/EU_Covered_Agreement.a
spx [https://perma.cc/75TH-E6GA]. 
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on July 14, 2017 that the Treasury Secretary would sign the covered 
agreement.34 He duly did so September 22, 2017.35 
In particular, the covered agreement creates a federal role in 
overseeing the capital rules for reinsurers, and limits the kind of rules 
the states can impose on insurers.36 In  reinsurance,  the  agreement  
reduces regulatory  barriers  to  foreign  competition  in  the  U.S.  
and E.U.37    Its  group supervision principles, in contrast, harmonize 
the regulatory approaches of the supervision of large insurance 
companies’ operation in both jurisdictions.38 The agreement also 
includes an information exchange component designed, among other   
things,   to   deepen   regulatory ties   between   American   and 
European   insurance   supervisors.39     The   agreement   thus   sets   
regulatory parameters for the E.U. and U.S. insurance industries, and 
requires the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to monitor and oversee 
the implementation of the agreement in the U.S., which must be done 
by state regulators.40 
B.  The Covered Agreement 
It is perhaps useful to further interrogate the way the covered 
agreement operates, for it does not embody a uniform commitment to 
globalism, and, in its details, is indicative of the careful and stop-and-
start nature of regulatory harmonization.41 
As for reinsurance, the covered agreement is best understood as 
an effort to reduce regulatory barriers to foreign competition in the 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; see also John S. Pruitt et al., Legal Alert: US-EU Covered Agreement: 





T6PG] for background on the agreement’s adoption. 
36. Id.; Bilateral Agreement Between The United States Of America And The 
European Union On Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance And 
Reinsurance, U.S.-E.U., Sept. 21, 2017, T.I.A.S. 18-404 [hereinafter Bilateral 
Reinsurance Agreement]. 
37. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36. 
38. Id. 
39. Simpson, supra note 30. 
40. The Federal Industry, Hearing on H.R. 3762 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous. and Ins., Comm. On Fin. Serv., and U.S. House of Reps., 115th 
Cong. 11-12 (2017) (statement of Katharine L. Wade, Chair of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ International Relations 
Commission). 
41. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36. 
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U.S. and E.U.42 The agreement serves to remove posted collateral and 
local presence requirements for E.U. and U.S. reinsurers doing 
business across the  Atlantic.43 The reinsurance portion of the 
agreement thus reduces trade barriers in both the United States and 
the European Union in a way likely to benefit American consumers.44   
It is something like a trade deal, contained within the narrower   
confines   of   a   limited   agreement   on   international   insurance 
regulation. 45 In particular, the requirement that foreign reinsurance 
firms post 100% collateral to do business in certain American 
jurisdictions makes little sense for well-supervised European 
reinsurers.46  This problem has been apparent for years,47 and yet any 
reduction in the collateral requirements, which thereby would open up 
the U.S. reinsurance market and introduce new competitors, to the 
benefit of insurance companies and ultimately consumers, has been 
slow.48 
The agreement prevents U.S. state insurance regulators from 
requiring E.U. reinsurers to post such high levels of collateral as a 
condition for U.S. firms to be credited for their contracts with E.U. 
reinsurers.49 
The   United   States   also   got   something   for   American   
re-insurance companies.50  One of the covered agreement’s objectives, 
 
42. Simpson, supra note 30. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. And it was assessed as such. The American Insurance Association, an 
industry group, said that the “agreement on prudential matters will end the 
discriminatory actions against U.S. insurers and reinsurers, increase U.S. 
competitiveness, and boost the international standing of the U.S. state-
based insurance regulatory system.” Marguerite Seidel, AIA Statement on 
U.S.-EU Covered Agreement, AM. INS. ASS’N (July 14, 2017), 
http://www.aiadc.org/media-center/all-news-releases/2017/july/ aia-
statement-on-u-s-eu-covered-agreement [https://perma.cc/PG8N-TCMC]. 
46. See generally Ernst Csiszar, Issues Relating to Collateral Requirements 
Imposed upon Alien Reinsurers of United States Ceding Insurers, THE 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE - ISSUES AND PRACTICE, 522 (2005) 
(discussing the issues regarding collateral requirements for non-US insurers 
doing business in the United States). 
47. Id. at 523-4. 
48. Id. 
49. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 3. 
50. See The National System of State Regulation and Covered Agreement, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISS’RS, 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_covered_agreement.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W2MF-X5ER] (last updated July 10, 2018) (“In 
exchange, the EU will not impose local presence requirements on U.S. firms 
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as announced in its Article I, is “the elimination, under specified 
conditions, of local presence requirements.”51   Specifically, the 
agreement relieves U.S. reinsurers from the obligation to establish a 
local presence—i.e., a branch or subsidiary—in the E.U.52  The local 
presence requirement in the E.U. was also a real burden on the ability 
of American reinsurers to access that market.53 The elimination of 
that burden should level the playing field for American and European 
reinsurance firms  by making it  easier  for  American  reinsurers  to  
access  the  European market  without  opening  an  office  in  every  
jurisdiction  in  which  they  do business.54 
The agreement also contains provisions on group supervision.55 
Under the E.U.’s “Solvency   II” regime, European   insurers   are   
subject to group supervision, and foreign insurers seeking to do 
business in the E.U. are required to establish that they are supervised 
in a comparable way.56  Most disquieting for American firms is that 
the E.U. reserved for itself the right to impose additional capital and 
other regulatory requirements on firms based in countries that were 
not determined by the E.U. to have a supervisory system that is 
“equivalent” to the Solvency II supervisory system.57 
The  covered  agreement  provides  that  this  requirement  will  
not  be imposed  upon  American  insurers  doing  business  in  
Europe,  provided  that they can establish that they are being 
adequately supervised as groups.58 The “consolidated” form of 
supervision assesses the solvency and soundness of insurance firms 
 
operating in the EU, and effectively must defer to U.S. group capital 
regulation for U.S. entities of EU-based firms”). 
51. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 3. 
52. The National System of State Regulation and Covered Agreement, supra 
note 50. 
53. EU/U.S. Covered Agreement: What’s Next?, HOGAN LOVELLS, 
https://www.hlinsurancelaw.com/files /2017/02/EU-US-Covered-
Agreement-What-Next.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH9H-F2EF] (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2018). 
54. Pruitt et al., supra note 35. 
55. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art 4. 
56. U.S.–EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
research/app/uploads/2017/01/Covered-Agreement-Fact-Sheet-011317-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5CC-JTM4]. As Elizabeth Brown has 
said, ”Solvency II will likely influence how insurance regulators outside of 
the EU regulate insurance, particularly those in the United States.” 
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L LAW 953, 972 (2009). 
57. U.S.–EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, supra note 56. 
58. Pruitt et al., supra note 35. 
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with reference to all of their subsidiaries;59 in the U.S., solvency is 
traditionally assessed at the subsidiary, or operating entity, level on a 
state by state basis so that each state regulatory monitors the 
solvency of each insurance company subsidiary doing business in that 
state.60   The agreement was  in  this  way  designed  to  “establish[]  
that  the  [American]  supervisory authority,  and  not  the   
[European]   supervisory  authority,  will  exercise worldwide   
prudential   insurance   group   supervision,”   as   the   agreement 
provides in Article I.61  It means that U.S. insurance groups operating 
in the E.U. will be supervised at the worldwide group level by the 
relevant U.S. insurance supervisors rather than through a European 
process imposed on American insurers and based on Solvency II. 
Finally, the agreement provides for an information exchange that 
will amplify and improve contacts between regulators in the U.S. and 
E.U.62 Information exchanges have proven to be the start of more 
elaborate cooperation by banking and securities regulators.63  That 
precedent suggests that the agreement on information exchange can 
set the stage for further cooperation. 
C.  Conclusion 
If   the   agreement   itself   can   be   celebrated   for   sensible 
policymaking, its most notable characteristic is its emergence in the 
context of an administration skeptical of foreign economic 
commitments and inclined to deregulate wherever possible.64 The 
covered agreement retains a federal role in insurance supervision by 
requiring harmonization with European Union standards in the cases 
above, and requires the federal government, which has been reducing 
its role in insurance regulation, to oversee it.65   In  this  way, 
international  regulatory  cooperation  has  altered  the  balance  of  
 
59. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 1(c). 
60. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of 
Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537 (2015) (describing 
the U.S. regulatory structure for assessing solvency among insurance 
entities). 
61. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 1(c). 
62. Id. at Art. 1(d). 
63. See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 475, 485 (2010). 
64. See Max Fisher, What Is Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www. nytimes.com/2016/11/12/world/what-is-
donald-trumps-foreign-policy.html [https://perma.cc/JXH5-H5FR] 
(discussing President Trump’s policy of “America First,” and his willingness 
to break away from foreign agreements).  
65. Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 35 at Preamble; see also U.S.–
EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, supra note 56.  
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regulatory power between the federal government and the states in 
favor of the federal government. It is another example of how 
regulatory cooperation, in this case adopted through a non-treaty   
commitment made to European Union regulators, can stabilize 
American   economic policymaking from one administration to the 
next. 
Iii. The Turn Away From Trade Agreement-Driven 
Regulatory Harmonization 
Over the past two decades, proposed trade deals have regularly 
included a commitment, by the parties to the deal, to some form of 
regulatory harmonization.66  The  regulatory  coherence  and  
cooperation  components  of multilateral   trade   deals   have   
evolved   from   a   more   traditional   set   of commitments to 
transparent administrative procedure in trade negotiations in an  
effort  to  bring  substantive  regulatory  standards  into  alignment  
across borders.67 
Some of the interest in regulatory harmonization through trade is 
long standing, and could even be seen in the GATT’s Article X.68  
Article X provided for  the  publication  and  even-handed  
administration  of  trade  rules  by  the contracting  parties.69  These 
transparency obligations were reaffirmed in the Uruguay round of 
agreements that created the WTO in 1994, which adopted the 
GATT.70 
But recently, developed countries have sought to go further.71  
Regulatory cooperation offers not just its own appeal to  
66. See generally Jeffrey J. Schott, Opinion, Are Trade Agreements Good for 
Americans?: Trade Agreements Benefit Consumers and Producers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016, 3:20 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2016/03/17/are-trade-agreements-good-for-americans 
[https://perma.cc/WH74-NSGP] (discussing the regulatory harmonization 
that occurs in a trade deal). 
67. See Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization 
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BRIT. J. OF AM. LEGAL 
STUD. 505, 527 (2016) (providing an example of the regulatory coherence 
and its novelty). 
68. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, originally signed Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 182 (revised and resigned on Apr. 14, 
1994) [hereinafter GATT].  
69. Id. 
70. Muhammad Ijaz Latif, Uruguay Round of GATT and Establishment of the 
WTO, 65 Pᴀᴋ. Hᴏʀɪᴢᴏɴ 53, 63 (2012). 
71. See generally Elizabeth Trujillo, Regulatory Cooperation in International 
Trade and Its Transformative Effects on Executive Power, 25 IND. J. 
GLOBAL STUDIES 365 (2018) (explaining the regulatory cooperation in 
international trade). 
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standardization and harmonization of rules across borders.  American 
regulators and businesses have also thought that it could improve 
their procedural protections abroad.72   
The United States, for example, does not pass rules without 
engaging in a  lengthy  notice  and  comment  proceeding  prior  to  
the  rule’s  passage.73 What is more—agency  missteps  in  complying  
with  notice  and  comment requirements,   including   the   
requirement   that   the   agency   respond   to substantive  
comments  in  promulgating the  final  rule—form  a  basis  for  the 
reversal of many rules on judicial review.74 
American administrative law is in some ways an outlier in this 
regard, but American exporters and multinational corporations find 
the prospect of American-style notice and comment in other 
jurisdictions to be appealing.75 Thus far, the European Union has 
resisted the effort to institute notice and comment in producing its 
own directives or in the regulations promulgated by its members.76  
Institutionalizing something like notice and comment rulemaking in a 
trade deal has become something that American trade negotiators 
have increasingly tried to do. 
A.  Regulatory Harmonization in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 4, 
2016 but is awaiting ratification from all parties,77 and has since been 
withdrawn from by the United States.78 President Trump vowed to 
 
72. Promote Global Regulatory Cooperation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Aug. 15, 
2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/promote-global-
regulatory-cooperation [https://perma.cc/VBN8-4NGU]. 
73. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 §4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2010) 
(outlining American process of notice and comment rulemaking). 
74. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 
(D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 
240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
75. Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. & Pᴏʟ. 695, 710 (2005). 
76. See Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better 
Law-Making, Apr. 13, 2016, 123 O.J.L. 1 and Proposal for an 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation, COM (2015) 216 final 
(May 20, 2015). 
77. Cᴏɴɢ. Rᴇsearch. Sᴇʀᴠ., R44489, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): 
KEY PROVISIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 1-2 (2016). 
78. TPP: What is it and Why Does it Matter?, BBC Nᴇᴡs (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715 [https://perma.cc/MY6A-
TFX9]. 
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withdraw from the agreement on his first day in office;79 he ultimately 
met that pledge.80 
The U.S. Trade Representative described TPP as “the first U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement to include a chapter on regulatory coherence, 
reflecting a growing appreciation of the relevance of this issue to 
international trade and investment” but also notes that nothing in 
TPP will require changes to U.S. regulations or regulatory 
procedures. 81 
TPP encourages a number of best regulatory practices, including 
publication of its rules, regulatory impact assessments, coordination 
between parties, and regular review of its procedures.82 These 
provisions have  appeared  in  prior  trade  agreements  like  the  
GATT,  in  that  they  are procedural, although the inclusion of a 
requirement of a regulatory impact analysis – in the U.S., it would be 
considered a cost benefit analysis – is new and somewhat 
controversial.83  The agreement would have encouraged notice and 
comment rulemaking, although language is significantly permissive 
regarding notice and comment timelines (“to the extent possible”) and 
do not require responses to comments.84 
Article 25.6  of  the  TPP  would  have  established  a  
Committee  on Regulatory Coherence which is required to review 
regulatory practices  at least once every five years with a view toward 
making recommendations for amending    the    Regulatory   
Coherence    chapter    to    the    implementing Commission.85 
Further, per Article 25.11, dispute settlement mechanisms in the 
TPP would have applied to the regulatory coherence chapter, 
meaning that those provisions are not subject to dispute settlement at 
 
79. Trump Says US to Quit TPP on First Day in Office, BBC Nᴇᴡs (Nov. 22, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-us-canada-38059623 
[https://perma.cc/NW9M-QLAV]. 
80. Trump Executive Order Pulls out of TPP Trade Deal, BBC Nᴇᴡs (Jan. 24, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com /news/world-us-canada-38721056 
[https://perma.cc/6KC2-NHSE].  
81. U.S. Trade Representative, TPP CHAPTER 25 SUMMARY: REGULATORY 
COHERENCE 3 (2015), https:// ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/TPP-Chapter-
Summary-Regulatory-Coherence.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YE9-NRGH]. 
82. Id. at 2-3. 
83. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 68. 
84. U.S. Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Rᴇᴘʀᴇsᴇɴᴛᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, Tʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴs-Pᴀᴄɪfɪᴄ Pᴀʀᴛɴᴇʀsʜɪᴘ, 
Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ 26: Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴀʀᴇɴᴄʏ ᴀɴᴅ Aɴᴛɪ-Cᴏʀʀᴜᴘᴛɪᴏɴ 2-3 (2016), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Transparency-and-
Anti-corruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXS-XBBN]. 
85. U.S. Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Rᴇᴘʀᴇsᴇɴᴛᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, Tʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴs-Pᴀᴄɪfɪᴄ Pᴀʀᴛɴᴇʀsʜɪᴘ, 
Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ 25: Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛᴏʀʏ Cᴏʜᴇʀᴇɴᴄᴇ 4-5 (2016), https://ustr.gov 
/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Regulatory-Coherence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S676-7W3E]. 
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all under the agreement.86 The Australian scholars Andrew Mitchell 
and Elizabeth Sheargold argue   that   exempting   regulatory   
coherence obligations from dispute settlement was designed to 
encourage greater participation by states in the regulatory 
harmonization process.87 
B. Regulatory Harmonization in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was 
being negotiated between the E.U.  and the U.S.  actively during the 
Obama Administration, but  efforts to conclude a deal have largely 
ceased since the inauguration of President Trump.88 
When the agreement was being pursued actively, it was clear from 
both parties’ stated objectives that regulatory coherence and 
coordination would be addressed in the final agreement to some 
degree.89 
The European Union published its proposed text on regulatory 
cooperation, and updated it as of March 2016.90  The text provides 
generally that  regulatory  cooperation  will  be  carried  out  
transparently  and  made available for public comment, and 
specifically requires that a joint E.U.-U.S. Annual Regulatory 
Cooperation Program providing an overview of ongoing and  planned  
regulatory  cooperation  initiatives  be  published  by each  party 
online and updated once per year.91  The program “shall include, as a 
minimum, all activities related to future regulatory cooperation 
covered by specific or sectoral provisions concerning goods and 
 
86. Id. at 7. 
87. Elizabeth Sheargold & Andrew D. Mitchell, The TPP and Good Regulatory 
Practices: An Opportunity for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory 
Autonomy?, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 587, 600 (2016). 
88. See Robert Wisner & Neil Campbell, Bringing the Home State Back in: The 
Case for Home State Control in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 19 Bᴜs. 
L. Iɴᴛ’ʟ 5, 5 (2018) (“Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, 
the United States has… largely abandoned a possible Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union.”). 
89. See Bernd Lange, Reasonable and Balanced Trade Agreement with the 
United States: TTIP Chapter on Regulatory Coherence, EUR. PARLIAMENT, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-reasonable-and-
balanced-trade-agreement-with-the-united-states/file-ttip-regulatory-
coherence/10-2016 [https://perma.cc/2X47-GVRG] (last visited Oct. 19, 
2018). 
90. DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TTIP-
EU PROPOSAL FOR CHAPTER: REGULATORY COOPERATION (2016), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_ 154377.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FLR3-5RSG]. 
91. Id. at art. x.6. 
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services in this Agreement and shall be published at the latest by the 
time of signature of this Agreement.”92 
An E.U.  fact sheet on regulatory cooperation, published in 
January 2015, acknowledges   the   importance   of   regulatory   
cooperation   while emphasizing that the Regulatory Cooperation 
Body would not have the power to change the rules set out in E.U.  
treaties about how regulations are developed.93   Finally, on March 21 
2016, an E.U.  position paper  titled  “Regulatory Cooperation in 
TTIP:  The Benefits” detailed the E.U.’s rationale for strong 
regulatory cooperation, including freeing resources based on 
harmonization.94 
The U.S.  Trade Representative did not release a proposed text 
on regulatory cooperation, but published a TTP factsheet in March 
2014 with general U.S. objectives, including regulatory coherence and 
transparency.95 The factsheet characterizes TTIP as “an opportunity 
to develop cross-cutting disciplines on regulatory practices” and gives 
examples of such best practices as “greater   transparency,   
participation   and   accountability”   in   regulatory development, 
“evidence-based analysis and decision-making, and a whole- of-
government  approach”  in  regulatory  management,  terms  that  do  
not convey much, but perhaps hint at the policy interest in the 
subject.96   USTR has indicated its hope that the U.S. and E.U. will 
examine ways to “increase regulatory  compatibility  in  specific  
sectors  through  a  range  of  regulatory cooperation  tools  as  well  
as  other  steps  aimed  at  reducing  or  eliminating unnecessary  
regulatory  differences.”97  The  U.S.  aims to promote greater 
regulatory compatibility “with extensive input from stakeholders, and 
in collaboration with our regulators.”98 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one of the most important of 
those stakeholders in the U.S., published its own detailed paper on its 
 
92. Id. 
93. Regulatory Coperation in TTIP, Eᴜʀ. Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ (2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january 
/tradoc_153002.1%20RegCo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3GU-AZK9]. 
94. Eᴜʀ. Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ, Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛᴏʀʏ Cᴏᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ɪɴ TTIP: Tʜᴇ Bᴇɴᴇfɪᴛs 
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/ 
tradoc_154379.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DQN-PAN8]. 
95. U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits In the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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objectives regarding regulatory coherence and cooperation in the 
TTIP on February 27, 2015.99     In  addition  to  indicating  more  
general  support  for  publication, transparency,  and  centralization  
of  regulatory  decisions,  the  Chamber  has indicated its support for 
development of a filter to identify measures that have the most 
significant effect on the bilateral trade relationship and to prioritize 
cooperation on those activities.100    To that end, the Chamber has 
urged the parts to adopt a Regulatory Compatibility Assessment for 
those measures that pass through the filter in order to make more 
information available to both parties  (while  not  mandating  
regulatory  decisions),101  and  to create nonbinding Regulatory   
Equivalence   Assessments   to   determine   which regulations are 
equivalent between parties. 102 
C.  Conclusion 
The Trump Administration’s turn away from these mega-
regionals103 has shifted    the    effort    to    implement    the    
otherwise    generally   informal commitments towards regulatory 
harmonization in a trade treaty.  In that sense, the Trump 
administration has turned away from the full-throated embrace of 
international regulatory standards, which is a turn away from 
international regulatory cooperation in general. But the interest in 
achieving common standards in the business community remain 
strong.104 
We may see that regulatory harmonization continues to be 
pursued in practice, if not written into renegotiated trade deals of the 
future. 
 
99. U.S. Cʜᴀᴍʙᴇʀ ᴏf Cᴏᴍ., Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛᴏʀʏ Cᴏʜᴇʀᴇɴᴄᴇ & Cᴏᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ɪɴ 
ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsᴀᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ ᴀɴᴅ Iɴᴠᴇsᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ Pᴀʀᴛɴᴇʀsʜɪᴘ (TTIP) 
(2015), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/regulatory_ 
coherence_regulatory_cooperation_-chamber_ttip_paper-final_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7C5B-ZXYV] [hereinafter U.S. Cʜᴀᴍʙᴇʀ ᴏf Cᴏᴍ., 
Regulatory Coherence]. 
100. See, e.g., David Zaring, Free Trade Through Regulation?, 89 S. Cᴀʟ. L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 863, 864 n.6 (2016) (discussing the Chamber of Commerce’s support 
for a domestic regulatory initiative). 
101. U.S. Cʜᴀᴍʙᴇʀ ᴏf Cᴏᴍ., Regulatory Coherence, supra note 99, at 11-13. 
102. Id. at 13-14. 
103. Mega-regionals as deep integration partnerships between countries or 
regions with a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment. 
Tomas Hirst, What are Mega-Regional Trade Agreements?, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴ. 
F. (July 9, 2014), https://www.weforum.org/agenda /2014/07/trade-what-
are-megaregionals/[https://perma.cc/2A5E-5JQK]. 
104. See Zaring, supra note 100 (discussing the desire for regulatory cooperation 
in globalization and trade). 
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Conclusion 
Regulatory cooperation is not always something to celebrate, 
though I and others have marveled at the way it has resulted in a 
serious regime of financial regulation, beginning with nothing more 
than an increasingly elaborated set of deals among financial 
supervisors. There may be good reasons for less burdensome 
regulation in finance, or more generally – the Trump administration 
has come out in favor of financial deregulation at home. And in 
abandoning trade deals with regulatory coherence components, turned 
away from  a  formal  commitment  to  regulatory  harmonization, 
expressed through a treaty. 
But what we see from the international commitments made by 
regulators is that they can curb deregulatory impulses, and continue 
international cooperation among countries that are feuding on trade 
or other grounds.  In that sense, regulatory cooperation has—so far—
proven to be a constraint on an administration that otherwise appears 
to be less interested in cooperation and strong global standards than 
its predecessors. 
In this sense, regulatory cooperation is “sticky,” in that it is 
difficult to exit from cooperative processes even when those processes 
are not particularly deregulatory. This is so for a number of reasons, 
including path dependence, socialization, and the straightforward 
requirement that domestic regulators respond to the globalization of 
the marketplace.105  Habits of international agreement, it turns out, 
are often hard to break. 
This    stickiness    naturally    leads    to    some    consistency    
between administrations with different foreign policy priorities.      
Regulatory cooperation has also operated at a level below diplomacy 
and high politics.106 But as economic matters become more and more 
 
105. See Ian Greener, Path Dependence, Eɴᴄʏᴄʟᴏᴘæᴅɪᴀ Bʀɪᴛᴀɴɴɪᴄᴀ (Sept. 
1, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/path-dependence 
[https://perma.cc/HCX6-F93N] (defining path dependence); see also 
Aʟᴀsᴛᴀɪʀ Iᴀɪɴ Jᴏʜɴsᴛᴏɴ, Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs: Cʜɪɴᴀ ɪɴ 
Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Iɴsᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴs, 1980-2000: SOCIALIZATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, at 20-21 (G. John Ikenberry & Marc 
Trachtenberg eds., 2008) (defining socialization); see generally Dᴀᴠɪᴅ 
Vᴏɢᴇʟ & Rᴏʙᴇʀᴛ A. Kᴀɢᴀɴ, DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW 
GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES (2002), 
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/ 
content/qt4qf1c74d/qt4qf1c74d.pdf?t=lc03gd [https://perma.cc/VWV8-
S6N8] (discussing domestic regulators response to globalization). 
106. See BRIAN HOCKING ET AL., FUTURES FOR DIPLOMACY: INTEGRATIVE 
DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, CLINGENDAEL: NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (discussing the growth and influence of 
regulatory cooperation amongst past norms of “high politics” and 
diplomacy). 
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important in foreign policy, sticky regulatory cooperation used to 
address those economic matters should help to smooth the   
transitions  between   administrations   with   different perspectives—
and in so  doing, limit the flexibility of policymakers to do something   
entirely different. Perhaps most interestingly, regulatory cooperation 
has these effects without in any way binding the hands of the new 
policymakers in any legal way. 
 
